474 of the amount harvested in excess of the plan; for sunflower seed, soybeans, rapeseed, and flaxseed, one-third; for milk, 15 percent; and for sugar beets and cotton, an extra 50 percent of the average official delivery price for each additional quintal (220.46 pounds) produced above the plan.

These bonus payments are distributed to individuals on the basis of the number of workdays earned, and they are in addition to the payments described earlier. There is, however, an important prerequisite for eligibility to these bonuses: A recipient must have put in a certain minimum number of *actual days* of labor during the agricultural season from March 1 to November 10. This requirement is in addition to the provision of the decree of May 27, 1939, and April 17, 1942, that a member of a kolkhoz must earn a certain minimum number of workdays during a year in order to be in good standing.

In many cases the bonus scheme was reported to have been nullified by the setting of production goals beyond the reach of even the most efficient farmers. The better kolkhozy, with their high standards of performance, were said to be particularly affected by this malpractice. In recent years, little has been heard of the bonus payments.

In 1937, the latest year for which detailed data are available, an average of 438 workdays were credited to a kolkhoz peasant household and 194 to an able-bodied worker; 21.2 percent of the kolkhoz workers were credited with 50 or fewer workdays; 15.6 with 51 to 100; 25 percent with 101 to 200; 18.4 percent with 201 to 300; 11.3 percent with 301 to 400; and 8.5 percent with more than 400 workdays.[47] Among those who earned only 50 workdays, or less, there were undoubtedly many young persons and women with family responsibilities. In the group that earned most—more than 300 workdays—there was probably a heavier representation of the more efficient kolkhozy, where labor is more fully and effectively employed.

● [462] By a decree of May 27, 1939, there was established a minimum number of workdays for each member of the kolkhoz without distinction as to sex. The country was divided into three zones, and for each a corresponding minumum of 60, 80, and 100 workdays was set up. Nonfulfillment of the minimum was penalized by expulsion from the kolkhoz and loss of kitchen-garden plots. The minimum was raised during the war by a decree published in *Pravda*, April 17, 1942. A novel feature of this decree was the specific allocation of the required minimum of work during different periods of the year. For instance, in a kolkhoz of the Moscow Province, 25 workdays "must be worked up to June 1; 25 between June 1 and August 1; 35 between August 1 and October 1, and the remaining 15 workdays after October 1." Those who did not fulfill these requirements without valid reasons are liable on conviction by court to a penalty of up to 6 months of "correctional labor" in the kolkhoz and a deduction of 25 percent of their pay in favor of the kolkhoz treasury.

To sum up, earnings of the peasant from his work in the kolkhoz depend on four factors: first, on the nature of the tasks assigned to him and their rating in terms of workdays; second, on his performance of these tasks—the quantity and quality of the work done; third, on the output achieved by the brigade or zveno, which serves as a basis for adjusting upward or downward the number of workdays earned and

[47] SAUTIN, KOLKHOZY VO VTOROI STALINSKOI PYATILETKE, p. 38.

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The wards of the children's homes who have reached age 12 are trained at the workshops or at the agricultural stations of such homes . . . . Once they have reached age 14, they are sent either to the trade, railroad, or factory-shop schools or to work at some industrial enterprise. . . . The wards of the labor colonies of the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR . . . are sent to trade, railroad or factory-shop schools . . . or to work at some industrial enterprise after they have reached age 14 and have completed their period of confinement to the colony. . . .[63]

"Article 122 of the Soviet Constitution begins with this proud statement: Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, government, cultural, political, and other public activities." It is true that women are paid the same wages as men for the work of the same quality and quantity. But they are also required to perform equal tasks with men. Their equality must sometimes appear to them rather oppressive. The last twelve years' evolution of Soviet labor legislation has pointed with insistence toward the equality of both women and juveniles 16 years old with adult men—equality of risks, and equality of labor duty.

"To give into consideration the physiological particularities of the female organism, the Code of Labor Legislation forbids employment of women in particularly heavy or harmful" to health occupations (Article 122). This [illegible] was approved in 1932 by the People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR. Because of the uninterrupted improvement [illegible] in the health conditions of work this list was [illegible] later on. For instance, women were admitted to work as rail[illegible] and [illegible] were allowed to work on all occupa[illegible] a few especially arduous tasks. Similar [illegible] of employment of women on especially [illegible] established for women lower maximal norms [illegible] than for men. For instance, to [illegible] which adult women may be asked to [illegible] and [illegible] surface. The corresponding maximum load for men is 50 kilograms.[64]

An adult woman means here a woman at least 18 years old. One may imagine how Soviet women must rejoice in equality with men when they work as railroad engineers or railroad stokers, on loading operations carrying by hand loads weighing some 20 kilograms, in the mines as underground workers, or on night shifts. Women who are not pregnant enjoy equality insofar as night or overtime work is concerned: "According to Article 131 of the Code of Labor Legislation pregnant women are not admitted to night work. Beginning with the fourth month of pregnancy they are not required to perform overtime work."[65] Except for a few occupations, women may be employed on any underground job, exactly like juveniles 16 years old.[66] When women employed on loading or unloading operations are provided with vehicles for transporting loads, their maximal norms are as follows: 50 kilograms, if they

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462 use wheelbarrows; 60 to 115 kilograms, depending on other factors, if they use small carts with two, three or four wheels, and 600 kilograms, if they use rail trucks.[87]

The deterioration in the situation of women, or, as Soviet authors would say, the improvement in their equality, was marked by the following dates: the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 1, 1938, bestowing on women the privilege of equality in the occupations of railroad locomotive engineers and stokers and of locksmiths repairing locomotives; the decision of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of June 13, 1940, conceding the right to work on fluvial transport, except as stokers on steam boats and as sailors on the cargo-passenger boats; the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of October 25, 1940, opening the mines to women, except for a few particularly difficult occupations; the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of July 8, 1944, allowing women to work overtime and at night.[88] Stalin said at the 18th Congress of the Party: "Women constitute an immense labor army and they educate our children, our future generations, that is to say, prepare our future."[89] They are most certainly looked upon by the Soviet State as an immense labor army; one may wonder only if they have left much leisure to educate their children.

Workers attached to their jobs

The basic concept of the Soviet labor relationship consists in its indefinite duration. The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of June 26, 1940, Article 2, Paragraph 2: "The departure from an enterprise or office without a transfer from one enterprise or office to another may take place only [with] the permission granted by the director of the enterprise or the head of the office."[90] Once a worker or an office employee has been hired by an enterprise or office, he may not quit his job without the express permission of the management of the enterprise or of the head of the office, the latter finding themselves restricted in their freedom to grant such a permission to situations which are foreseen by State legislation. The Soviet worker or office employee is legally bound to his job, his factory, mine, office, or any other place where he works. The analogous position in the Middle Ages was called serfdom, the serf being a peasant bound to the soil of the village and having no right to transfer elsewhere without the permission of his landlord. Today the Soviet citizen—worker, official, or collective farmer—is in a similar condition. He is bound to his place of employment for the rest of his life unless the State decides that he might be granted the required permission to transfer to another job. Actually, the State comprises other individuals who happen to exercise State powers: the leaders of the Communist Party, who establish by law the conditions under which a worker or an office employee might be allowed to quit his job, and managers of factories or heads of offices (high

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vites) pay 0.50 r. fee for each 50 r. of wages or 1 percent of their wages; those [467]
who have a salary higher than 1000 r. pay 1 r. for each 100 r., or, rather surprisingly, also 1 percent. There is no progressive tariff.[3]

According to V. V. Kuznetsov, former leader of Soviet trade unions, they include at the present time over 90 percent of all Soviet officials and workers.[4]

The Statute of the Trade Unions defines the purpose of their activities. It lists as the first objective: "To organize the socialist competition of workers and officials for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of State plans, for the raising of labor productivity, the improvement in the quality of production, and lowering of its cost." This aim corresponds exactly to the most vital interest of the State as a general employer. The second objective will be better understood if one bears in mind that it involves the activities of the supreme organ of the trade unions, namely the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, a body controlled by its chairman N. M. Shvernik, alternate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, and composed of high-ranking members of the Party who cannot be expected to oppose the Government which includes their immediate superiors within the Party: "To participate in planning and regulating of wages of workers and officials, in working out various systems of wages, their socialist guiding principle is the payment of labor according to its quantity and quality; they strive to introduce new progressive norms of output and they see to it that labor should be correctly assessed and paid in piece rates and progressing bonuses." This statement is a wholesale approval of the governmental policy of wide differentiation of incomes with ever-increasing norms of output.

Other objectives are administrative, because the trade unions have become a part of the State administration. Thus, trade unions must "exercise supervision over State labor protection and industrial security . . . [must] administer State social insurance, etc." If the administration of social insurance and of labor legislation were not in the hands of trade unions, the State would be involved in an additional expenditure by having its own network of appropriate administration. As a matter of economy, the former Ministry in charge of such administrative questions, the Ministry of Labor, was liquidated, and its functions were transferred to the trade unions. Trade unions have to "attract women into public, productive, and social life"; this idea corresponds to the [462]
wishes of the State and Party leadership of using the work of women to increase the available manpower. Trade unions "conclude collective agreements [468]
with the management of concerns." This objective sounds like the traditional one of any free trade union; but the substance of a collective agreement being determined beforehand by State regulations, there is nothing left to bargain for between management and employees. Therefore, the practice of collective agreements was quite realistically abandoned altogether for several years to be revived in 1947 as a means of State propaganda. Trade unions "assist their members in raising their ideological-political and general educational lev-

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4) Two-thirds of the average wages are paid during the whole maternity leave to: a) women who have been employed by their present enterprise for a period shorter than one year but longer than three months, the latter period being the minimum generally required; b) women building-workers who have been employed by one or several enterprises for less than the ten months out of the twelve that preceded the maternity leave.

5) Non-members of the trade unions are always paid half of their average wages for the first twenty days of the maternity leave and two-thirds for the remainder of the leave.[38]

The discrimination against women non-members of trade unions is not serious because these organizations are open to every employee. It might affect the economic situation of peasant-women who are employed on the basis of one-year contracts and who are not admitted to a trade union because they do not lose their status of peasants until this temporary contract is replaced by a permanent one.

The other distinctions correspond to the general policy of the Soviet Government to stabilize manpower by any means. Actually, the Party does not see in a pregnant woman only an expectant mother. It also gauges her economic usefulness to the State. As usual, the State overshadows the living individual. The policy of the Communist Party in attracting women to such heavy occupations as coal-mining, building, or as railroad-engine drivers and stokers is interesting. The equality of women for heavy tasks is fully realized.

State employees (excluding as usual the peasants), who are the parents of a newly-born child and whose combined wages do not exceed 500 roubles per month, receive an allowance of 300 r., if the father or mother has been employed by the same enterprise for at least three months. This sum of 300 r. is divided as follows: 220 r. are paid immediately at the birth of the child and the remaining 80 r. when the baby has reached the age of five months. Eighty roubles is not much, but the State does not want to risk them by a hasty payment, when the child might not survive the five months. The single allowance of 300 r. would go to the very poor people who are unskilled workers. Usually the joint income of skilled workers would be higher than 500 r. a month, as Soviet sources affirm that the latter sum is the average income for State officials or workers. A skilled worker in lower categories of skill might also benefit by that allowance if his wife is in poor health and does not herself work despite the general labor duty that applies to women as well.[39]

11. *The two pyramids: industrial might and social stratification*

The Soviet system of social insurance has one advantage: its wide coverage of practically all risks. Its weaknesses are two: the low amounts of pensions, because of the low wages and lack of interest by the State in citizens who have ceased to be economically useful; and its discriminations which usually cor-

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of whom, we would estimate, some 60 million were in the working age groups, 15–64. This left some 66 million in the same age groups outside of agriculture, of whom about 36 million were workers and employees, and the remainder artisans, members of armed forces, students, invalids, camp and prison population, and dependents. How rapidly the population in the working age groups outside of agriculture can grow will undoubtedly determine how rapidly nonagricultural employment will expand, and therefore also how rapidly the whole national product will be able to grow.

It is rather clear that the nonagricultural population in the working ages cannot continue to expand for the next twenty years at anything like the rate at which it has been expanding heretofore. If we postulate a decline in the agricultural population (between the ages of 15 and 64) as extreme as by a quarter—and this means a very considerable rise of labor productivity in agriculture considering the demands which will be inevitably made on it by that time—this would leave some 130 million for the nonagricultural population of working age or twice the number we have assumed for 1950. The share of workers and employees in the nonagricultural population is also conjectural, but it is difficult to see how it could be considerably higher proportionately than in 1950, when a large number of women and youths were gainfully employed. Of course, the claim made by the armed forces and by the forced labor camps in the future is a great unknown. However, a doubling of the number of workers and employees within twenty years means a yearly rate of increase of only 3.5%, or very much below past Soviet experience. A shortening of the present long work-week may hold down the increase in labor input even further.

A few points counteracting the effects of the slowing down of the growth of the nonagricultural labor force have to be considered. The sex composition of employment may be expected to move towards a higher proportion of males, as the present unbalanced age groups are replaced by newer generations, and as the economic pressure for women to seek employment also diminishes with the improvement in living conditions which must be anticipated, to some extent at least.[23] Even more serious is the present shortage of males in agriculture, and some correction of this situation seems also to be expected with time. Hence, some improvement in both urban and rural productivity may take place on account of this factor alone. Furthermore, a slower rate of absorption into nonagricultural employment may be conducive to greater efficiency of the whole nonagricultural sector. Another point to consider is the quality of the additions to the nonagricultural labor force. With industrialization and the mechanization of the countryside, the recruits of the future will have

[23] See Shimkin, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

tive to children increased. It is in good part explained by the fall in the number of persons under 16 in the labor force, due to the great rise in school attendance. In addition, the large-scale population migration from the farms apparently resulted in a loss of females from the labor force, expressed as a percentage of the female population 16–59—from 76.6% in 1926 to 67.0% in 1939. With the rural-urban shift, many females who had been in the agricultural labor force (1926) failed to enter the organized (state and cooperative) branches of the urban labor force. They either left the labor force or remained in it in a private capacity—strictly speaking, as "nonco-op handicraftsmen."

Reference to the degree by which the indicated increase in the total labor force fell short of some potential obscures the dramatic increases which took place in the most important reported sector, that of "workers and employees," i.e., hired labor. This sector has attracted considerable attention since the Five-Year Plans, because it contains the labor core of the industrialization drive. As shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1, the number doubled between 1926/27 and 1931/32 and has doubled again since then. In the most recent six-year period, 1946–51, the yearly average number displays an almost straight-line increase of 1.8 millions per year, compared to 1.1 millions per year (also almost linear) for the six-year period 1933–38. The increase during the postwar period represents a substantial overfulfillment of the planned increase in workers and employees for the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1946–50. The plan called for 33.5 million workers and employees by 1950, an increase of 6.3 million during the five years. Actually, by 1950, the average number reached 38.2 million, an increase of 11 million, or 75% over the plan.

The differential growth by sexes is interesting:

1. Once over the marked rise in the First Five-Year Plan, the number of male workers and employees increased by less than two million over the next seven years to 1939, and by another million, partly through annexations, up to 1941. In other words, the decade of the thirties was spent largely absorbing within the industrial system the huge increase in male hired labor which took place in the first years, rather than expanding the number much further. The number of males fell sharply during the war and regained its prewar level probably no earlier than 1949.

2. The number of female workers and employees, on the other hand, has increased substantially every peace-time year since 1926; and the fall during the war, 3 million, was moderate enough, all things considered. The number doubled by 1932, doubled again by 1941, and has risen another 35% since then. The increase in the size of the female hired labor force to a position close to equality with males is an outstanding characteristic of Soviet labor force development to date. However, the observer is struck as much by the relatively *slow* annual rise in the number of

males, as he is by the relatively *rapid* rise in the number of females. The situation would seem to be only partly explained by the effects of the early thirties (reaction to collectivization, etc.) and the war. Perhaps the balance of the explanation lies with the statistical deficiencies and non-reported labor noted above.

From 1926 to 1939, the number of workers and employees increased partly through the increase in the adult population and partly at the expense of other sectors in the labor force, notably agriculture. In the succeeding period, 1939–50, on the other hand, the increase in workers and employees entailed no decrease, and probably an increase, in the other sectors taken together—for territory comparable to 1939:

THE LABOR FORCE OTHER THAN WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES, FOR COMPARABLE TERRITORY [20]
(Thousands)

	Male	Female	Both sexes
1939	33,194	28,855	62,049
1950	33,100–37,900	30,100–32,400	63,200–70,300

The increase in the worker and employee labor force was undoubtedly limited by the war and reconstruction, while the supply of labor generally was augmented by the entry of large classes into the adult age group. This may explain why, in spite of excess deaths during the war, the reported increase in the number of workers and employees by 1950 could take place at the same time that the number in the other sectors (comparable territory) remained constant or even increased. This discussion focuses attention on the worker and employee sector as a priority sector from the standpoint of manpower allocation. Perhaps, in addition, certain sectors within the "other sectors"—military and forced labor, or both—also absorbed labor on a relatively large scale. The worker and employee sector may have had to share the net increase in the supply of labor with other expanding sectors. For the dates involved, this is a practical question only with respect to forced labor, because the increase in the military, from 1.5 million males in 1939 to, say, 3.0 millions in 1950, is relatively small.

Of more general interest, especially in comparison with 1926, is the distribution of the labor force between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. For 1926 there are complete data, and the labor force is readily divided into the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. For 1939, only a rough approximation to this division is possible, because of

[20] The 1939 figures are derived as the total labor force minus the number of workers and employees, Table 3.2. The 1950 figures are derived as the total labor force, Table 3.4, minus the number of workers and employees, Table 3.3, minus the estimated number of nonworkers and employees in annexed territory (4.5 million males, and 3.5 million females; see text, below).

1.71 (see Table A 13). It is probable that the age structure of the urban proletariat differed less from that of the total population in 1939 than in 1926. Even so, this ratio of dependents per worker (1.62) would seem to be a maximum value for the worker-employee classes in 1939, *prior* to adjustments for change in the proportion of women among all workers and employees.

(4) There was a gradual increase in the employment of women during this period. The percentage of women among gainful workers shown by census statistics is usually higher than the corresponding proportion shown by employment statistics, owing to the greater frequency of unemployment among women. The proportion of women among workers and employees according to the 1926 census was 30.7 percent (see Table A 12). The proportion of women among workers and employees, according to employment statistics, rose from 27.2 percent in 1929 to 35.4 percent in 1937 and 37 percent in 1940.[7] Interpolating, we assume that the proportion was 36.2 percent at the time of the 1939 census, i.e., 56.74 women per 100 men. The transfer of women from a dependent status to that of workers and employees corresponding to this figure lowers the expected maximum ratio of dependents to workers, for 1939, from 1.62 to 1.41 (see Table A 13). The net effect of these observations is to suggest that the ratio of dependents per worker in the worker-employee sector of the Soviet population in 1939 must have been very similar to the figure for 1926 as adjusted to take account of the transfer of children from worker to dependent status (i.e., 1.38).

A different series of ratios, based on budget studies of the families of workers in heavy industry, covering the years 1930-1935, is reported in *Trud*.[8] In this series the number of dependents per worker is as follows: 1930, 2.05; 1931, 1.73; 1932, 1.73; 1933, 1.69; 1934, 1.66; 1935, 1.59. The average size of family (sometimes confused with the dependents-worker ratio) in this sample runs from 4.02 in 1930 to 3.80 in 1935—a decrease of only 5.5 percent, in contrast to the decrease of 22.4 percent in the dependents-worker ratio during the same period. Unfortunately, there is no exact information about the sampling procedure on which these statistics are based. Single persons are usually inadequately represented in budget studies. Where this is the case, the ratio of dependents to workers is, of course, higher than in the corresponding population. The dependents-worker ratio in this series declines sharply from 1930 to 1935, probably because of the increased employment of women, but one cannot safely assume that this indicates a general decline in the ratio of dependents to workers in the families of all workers and employees during the intercensus period, 1926-1939.

For our purposes it seems preferable to rely on the census data for 1926, with adjustments to take account of changing conditions during the intercensus period, rather than to use the data from an unspecified sample as reported in *Trud*. We will, therefore, proceed on the hypothesis that there were 141 family dependents per 100 workers and employees in the Soviet Union at the time of the 1939 census, applying this ratio uniformly to the major groups of employed personnel. It should be noted that this ratio of 141 is presumably a *maximum* value, since it is based on the application of age-specific ratios (from the 1926 census data for families of workers and employees) to the *general* population in 1939, with the specified adjustments, but with no adjustment for differences between the age distribution of the worker-employee sector and the total population.

The estimated population in the worker-employee sector indicated by these procedures is 68,779,000, or 40.3 percent of the total population of the Soviet Union (see Table A 14). This is considerably higher than the corresponding proportion reported for 1937 (34.7 percent), but it is much closer to the 1937 figure than that reported in the 1939 social class distribution (49.7 percent). In view of the arbitrary treatment of many of the factors affecting the determination of this estimate, it would certainly be unwise to treat it as having any high degree of validity. Consequently, we will experiment further with this result and test it against other data.

The miscellaneous group of pensioners, military personnel, and persons of unknown occupational status was reported as 4.2 percent of the population in 1937. This happens to be about the same proportion reported for these classes *plus* the unemployed and children under 10 years listed as gainfully occupied in 1926. The increase in institutional and military personnel had apparently offset the decrease in unemployment and in the labor of children under 10 years of age. Assuming the same proportion in 1939, the number of pensioners, military personnel, persons of unknown occupational status, and so on, was presumably about 7,160,000 at this time.

These estimates of worker-employee and miscellaneous sectors leave, as residual, a population of

[7] See American-Russian Institute, *Russia at War*, March 31, 1942.
[8] *Trud v SSSR, 1935*, Title 44[8], p. 342.

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similar in character to that which crosses Canada. Next to the tundra, in the Arctic, trees grow slowly and the forest has no commercial value. This area is even more empty of population than the tundra. Large areas in the north are nearly impassable due to fallen trees, swamps, and a tangle of bushes and vines. This is no place to make a forced landing while flying, for even if one can walk away from a wrecked plane, there is no place to go. There are no roads, and all travel is by water, or by air.

Farther south, with longer summers, the stunted Arctic taiga is replaced by excellent forests of pine, spruce, and larch. In normal years, shipments move to Western Europe, but so great is the domestic demand that there is little export surplus. The Soviet Union is in the midst of a boom economy and the demand for lumber is heavy. Despite extensive cutting, the normal growth is so vast that the country can look forward to timber supplies for a long period. Wood is still the cheapest fuel.

The original forest cover has largely been cleared from the now-cultivated agricultural plains, but excellent stands of commercial timber remain in the hill lands of the Urals and elsewhere. The Soviet Union as a whole is deficient in hardwoods such as oak and maple, so that most furniture, railroad ties, and log houses must be made of less durable softwoods.

While the greatest forest areas of the Union lie in Siberia, lumbering operations are developed chiefly in areas more accessible to the market needs of Soviet Europe. East of Leningrad are two great lakes, not much smaller than those in North America. Around their rocky shores are picturesque coniferous forests. The timber of this area enabled Czarist St. Petersburg to become one of the major lumber ports of Europe.

The decades since the revolution of 1917 have seen a great increase in construction, especially in the cities. Expanding industry and railroads have called for large amounts of lumber. Trees are usually rafted to saw mills, so that every river carries its quota of logs. The junction of a river and a railroad in the taiga is sure to mean a saw mill. While women are not required to work, there are so many jobs to be done that one may commonly find women working on lumber rafts or in saw mills. In fact, women do all kinds of jobs in the USSR. In part, this is economic necessity; in part it reflects the rapid expansion of the economy in a pioneering situation.

657 additional child. Monthly allowances go from
168 40 rubles for four children to a maximum of
651 150 rubles for ten or more children.[9] These
[465] grants must be seen against an average take-home pay of about 600 rubles per month for the period 1948-1952,[10] and a possibly higher figure for the period after 1952.[11] Thus, while it is doubtful that except in a minority of cases the provision of these grants will act as a positive financial incentive to having large families, nonetheless the financial deterrent to such families may be eased considerably, particularly for the low income families, who must spend a substantial portion of their budget on food. Scattered evidence from former Soviet citizens indicates, however, that for the time being the Soviet family tends to grow smaller, rather than larger, as might well be expected from a society in a rapid stage of industrialization and urbanization.

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745 Women who are employed in the labor force
843 are allowed leave with pay for 35 days before and 42 days after the birth of a child. In case of complications or the birth of twins, the postnatal leave is extended to 56 days or even more on the recommendation of a medical commission.[12] In some cases, mothers may also receive small stipends to cover expenses for layettes from the system of social insurance (administered by the trade-unions) in the case of women employed as workers and employees or in the case of peasant women from the social fund of the collective farm. Emergency loans covering unexpected expenses arising from the birth of the child may also be granted by social in-
745 surance organs. In addition, the code for the
843 protection of labor embodies specific measures
466 protecting the mother or future mother from
462 arbitrary actions on the part of management. For example, industrial managers cannot refuse to employ nor can they dismiss a woman because she is pregnant or because she is nursing her

[9] Article 2, 1944 decree, as amended in 1947; see *Izvestiya*, November 26, 1947, p. 1.

[10] Janet G. Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, [illegible]," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, [illegible] May, 1954.

[11] For some pessimistic data on the subject see Mac[illegible] as well as Michel Gordey, *Visa to Moscow*, New York, [illegible]

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education, about 27 percent were trained in engineering and related fields and employed in industry, manufacturing, mining, transportation, and communication. In that year about 16 percent were health field professionals, about 9 percent were in agricultural fields, and only 6 percent were in all socioeconomic service fields.

Some Social Aspects of Soviet Professional Labor Force

1. *Place of Women Among Soviet Professionals*

During the last 25 years, the participation of women in professional occupations in the Soviet Union has increased considerably. These changes in the relative proportion of women among professionals in individual fields are summarized in table 7.

The enormous increase in the relative proportion of women in the postwar period came about as a result of the war, and also because there were large numerical increases of professionals in the medical and eductional fields where the relative proportion of women continued to be extremely high. The relative proportion of women among professionals in 1950 was only slightly higher than the relative proportion of women among all workers and employees. In 1950 women accounted for 45.7 percent of all Soviet salaried persons employed in the nonagricultural labor force of salaried workers and employees.[26]

TABLE 7.—*Relative proportion of women among Soviet professionals (Year end)*

Occupational fields	*Percent of women among all professionals*		
	1929	*1940*	*1951*
Engineering	14.7	19.4	----
Agricultural	9.2	24.4	----
Socioeconomic	8.2	26.1	----
Educational	21.0	37.0	----
Health	47.2	56.9	----
All fields	23.5	32.6	50.5
Total number, women professionals	68,000	277,000	830,000

Sources: The original 1930 distribution was obtained from *Nar Khoz—1932*, 488–540, and *Itogi Pervoge FYP*, 217. Data for 1940 were obtained as a projection of enrollment trends for women during the period 1930–40 upon data for graduations (see table A–3 in the appendix tc ch. IV). The 1939 census serves as a check point (it also gives about 32 percent for women). The 1951 total number of women professionals (830,000) was reported in *Bol'shevik*, No. 12, 1952, p. 4. The percentage was derived on the basis of this total number of women professionals and the estimate of all professionals employed in the national economy in that year (table C–12 in the appendix to ch. VI). The percentage of women professionals in different occupational fields is not available.

[26] As estimated from Eason "Population and Labor Force" in A. Bergson, *Soviet Economic Growth*, 110.